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Abstract
We study a game on a graph G played by r revolutionaries and s spies. Initially,
revolutionaries and then spies occupy vertices. In each subsequent round, each revo-
lutionary may move to a neighboring vertex or not move, and then each spy has the
same option. The revolutionaries win if m of them meet at some vertex having no spy
(at the end of a round); the spies win if they can avoid this forever.
Let σ(G,m, r) denote the minimum number of spies needed to win. To avoid
degenerate cases, assume |V (G)| ≥ r−m+1 ≥ ⌊r/m⌋ ≥ 1. The easy bounds are then
⌊r/m⌋ ≤ σ(G,m, r) ≤ r−m+ 1. We prove that the lower bound is sharp when G has
a rooted spanning tree T such that every edge of G not in T joins two vertices having
the same parent in T . As a consequence, σ(G,m, r) ≤ γ(G) ⌊r/m⌋, where γ(G) is the
domination number; this bound is nearly sharp when γ(G) ≤ m.
For the random graph with constant edge-probability p, we obtain constants c and
c′ (depending on m and p) such that σ(G,m, r) is near the trivial upper bound when
r < c ln n and at most c′ times the trivial lower bound when r > c′ lnn. For the
hypercube Qd with d ≥ r, we have σ(G,m, r) = r−m+1 when m = 2, and for m ≥ 3
at least r − 39m spies are needed.
For complete k-partite graphs with partite sets of size at least 2r, the leading term
in σ(G,m, r) is approximately kk−1
r
m when k ≥ m. For k = 2, we have σ(G, 2, r) =⌈ ⌊7r/2⌋−3
5
⌉
and σ(G, 3, r) = ⌊r/2⌋, and in general 3r2m − 3 ≤ σ(G,m, r) ≤ (1+1/
√
3)r
m .
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1 Introduction
We study a pursuit game involving two teams on a graph. The first team consists of r
revolutionaries; the second consists of s spies. The revolutionaries want to arrange a one-
time meeting of m revolutionaries free of oversight by spies. Initially, the revolutionaries
take positions at vertices, and then the spies do the same. In each subsequent round, each
revolutionary may move to a neighboring vertex or not move, and then each spy has the
same option. All positions are known by all players at all times.
The revolutionaries win if at the end of a round there is an unguarded meeting, where a
meeting is a set of (at least) m revolutionaries on one vertex, and a meeting is unguarded
if there is no spy at that vertex. The spies win if they can prevent this forever. Let
RS(G,m, r, s) denote this game played on the graph G by s spies and r revolutionaries
seeking an unguarded meeting of size m.
The spies trivially win if s ≥ |V (G)| or r < m. If ⌊r/m⌋ < |V (G)|, then the revolution-
aries can form ⌊r/m⌋ meetings initially, and hence at least ⌊r/m⌋ spies are needed to avoid
losing immediately. On the other hand, the spies win if s ≥ r−m+1; they follow r−m+1
distinct revolutionaries, and the other m−1 revolutionaries cannot form a meeting. To avoid
degenerate or trivial games, henceforth in this paper we always assume
|V (G)| ≥ r −m+ 1 ≥ ⌊r/m⌋ ≥ 1.
Let σ(G,m, r) denote the minimum s such that the spies win the game RS(G,m, r, s).
The game of Revolutionaries and Spies was invented by Jozef Beck in the mid-1990s
(unpublished). Smyth promptly showed that σ(G,m, r) = ⌊r/m⌋ when G is a tree, achieving
the trivial lower bound (a later proof appears in [2]). Howard and Smyth [4] studied the
game when G is the infinite 2-dimensional integer grid with one-step horizontal, vertical,
and diagonal edges. They observed that the spy wins RS(G,m, 2m− 1, 1) (the spy stays at
the median position), and hence σ(G,m, r) ≤ r−2m+2 when r ≥ 2m−1 (note that always
σ(G,m, r) ≤ σ(G,m, r − 1) + 1). For m = 2, they proved that 6 ⌊r/8⌋ ≤ σ(G, 2, r) ≤ r − 2
when r ≥ 3; they conjectured that the upper bound is the correct answer.
Cranston, Smyth, and West [2] showed that σ(G,m, r) ≤ ⌈r/m⌉ when G has at most
one cycle. Furthermore, let G be a unicyclic graph consisting of a cycle of length ℓ and t
vertices not on the cycle. They showed that if m ∤ r (and as usual |V (G)| > r/m to avoid
degeneracies), then σ(G,m, r) = ⌊r/m⌋ if and only if ℓ ≤ max{⌊r/m⌋ − t+ 2, 3}.
Our objective in this paper is to advance the systematic study of this game. We show
that the trivial lower and upper bounds on σ(G,m, r) each may be sharp on various classes
of graphs. Furthermore, we obtain classes where neither bound is asymptotically sharp and
yet still σ(G,m, r) can be determined or closely approximated.
Say that G is spy-good if σ(G,m, r) equals the trivial lower bound ⌊r/m⌋ for all m and r
such that r/m < |V (G)|. In Section 2, we prove that every webbed tree is spy-good, where
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a webbed tree is a graph G containing a rooted spanning tree T such that every edge of G
not in T joins vertices having the same parent in T . For example, every graph having a
dominating vertex u is a webbed tree (rooted at u).
Section 3 considers general bounds. Always σ(G,m, r) ≤ γ(G) ⌊r/m⌋, where γ(G) is the
domination number of G (the minimum size of a set S such that every vertex outside S has
a neighbor in S). Since always ⌊r/m⌋ ≥ (r−m+ 1)/m, this upper bound is nontrivial only
when γ(G) < m. In that case, it is nearly sharp: for t,m, r ∈ N with t < m, we construct a
graph with domination number t such that σ(G,m, r) > t(r/m− 1).
In contrast to spy-good graphs, a graph G is spy-bad for r revolutionaries and meeting
size m if σ(G,m, r) equals the trivial upper bound r −m+ 1. Section 3 constructs chordal
graphs (and bipartite graphs) that are spy-bad (for given r and m).
In Section 4 we study hypercubes, showing first that the d-dimensional hypercube Qd is
spy-bad when d ≥ r and m = 2. Also, the winning strategy for the revolutionaries uses only
vertices near a fixed vertex. By splitting the revolutionaries into disjoint groups who play this
strategy around vertices far apart, it follows that when d < r ≤ 2d/d8, the revolutionaries
win against (d− 1) ⌊r/d⌋ spies on Qd (for m = 2). For general m, we show that hypercubes
are nearly spy-bad by proving σ(Qd, m, r) ≥ r − 39m for d ≥ r ≥ m. (For small m, the
bound σ(Qd, m, r) ≥ r − 34m2 when d ≥ r ≥ m is better.)
In these examples of spy-bad graphs, there are few revolutionaries compared to the num-
ber of vertices. Similar behavior holds for the random graph with constant edge-probability
(Section 5); the threshold for spies to win depends on the relationship between r and the
number of vertices, n. Via fairly simple arguments, we obtain constants c and c′ (depending
on m) such that almost always r−m+ 1 spies are needed when r < c lnn, while a multiple
of r/m spies are enough when r > c′ lnn. Using more intricate structural characteristics
of the random graph and a more complex strategy for the spies, Mitsche and Pra lat [5]
independently proved that σ(G,m, r) = (1+ o(1))r/m spies suffice when r grows faster than
(log n)/p (here also p may depend on n).
A complete k-partite graph is r-large if each part has at least 2r vertices, which is as many
vertices as the players might want to use. In Section 6, we prove σ(G,m, r) ≥ k
k−1
r
m
+ k.
Also σ(G,m, r) ≥ k
k−1
r
m+c
− k when k ≥ m and c = 1
k−1 .
Section 7 focuses on complete bipartite graphs and contains our most delicate results.
When G is an r-large complete bipartite graph, we obtain σ(G, 2, r) =
⌈ ⌊7r/2⌋−3
5
⌉
and
σ(G, 3, r) = ⌊r/2⌋. For larger m we do not have the complete answer; we prove(
3
2
− o(1)
)
r
m
− 2 ≤ σ(G,m, r) ≤
(
1 +
1√
3
)
r
m
< 1.58
r
m
,
where the upper bound requires r
m
≥ 1
1−1/√3 . We conjecture that σ(G,m, r) is approximately
3r
2m
when 3 divides m, but in other cases the revolutionaries do a bit better. That advantage
should fade as m grows, with σ(G,m, r) ∼ 3r
2m
.
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Upper bounds for σ(G,m, r) are proved using strategies for the spies. We define a notion
of stable position in the game. Proving that a particular number of spies can win involves
showing that in a stable position all meetings are guarded and that for any move by the
revolutionaries from a stable position, the spies can reestablish stability. This technique
is used for graphs with dominating vertices and for webbed trees in Section 2, for random
graphs in Section 5, and for complete multipartite and complete bipartite graphs in Sections 6
and 7. Each setting uses its own definition of stability tailored to the graphs under study.
Lower bounds are proved by strategies for the revolutionaries, which usually are much
simpler. Most of our winning strategies for revolutionaries take at most two rounds, but
on hypercubes they take m − 1 rounds. In [2], strategies for revolutionaries proving that
σ(Cn, m, r) = ⌈r/m⌉ (when r/m < n) may take many rounds.
Many questions remain open, such as a characterization of spy-good graphs. In all known
spy-good graphs, the spies can ensure that at the end of each round the number of spies at
any vertex v is at least ⌊r(v)/m⌋, where r(v) is the number of revolutionaries at v. Existence
of such a strategy is preserved when vertices expand into a complete subgraph. Also, Howard
and Smyth [4] observed that σ(G,m, r) is preserved by taking the distance power of a graph.
Hence every graph obtained from some webbed tree via some sequence of distance powers
or vertex expansions is spy-good, but these are not the only spy-good graphs.
It would also be interesting to bound σ(G,m, r) in terms of other graph parameters, such
as treewidth. Generalizations of the game are also possible, such as by allowing players to
travel farther in a move or by requiring more spies to guard a meeting. One can also consider
analogous games on directed graphs.
2 Dominating Vertices and Webbed Trees
We begin with graphs having a dominating vertex (a vertex adjacent to all others); we then
apply this result to webbed trees. Let N(v) denote the neighborhood of a vertex v. Also
N [v] = N(v) ∪ {v}, and N(S) = ⋃v∈S N(v).
Definition 2.1. For a graph G having a dominating vertex u, a position in the game
RS(G,m, r, s) is stable if, for each vertex v other than u, the number of spies at v is exactly
⌊r(v)/m⌋, where r(v) is the number of revolutionaries at v. The other spies, if any, are at u.
Theorem 2.2. If a graph G has a dominating vertex, then σ(G,m, r) = ⌊r/m⌋.
Proof. Let u be a dominating vertex in G, and let s = ⌊r/m⌋. Since s = ⌊r/m⌋, a stable
position will have a spy at u if there is a meeting at u. Hence a stable position has no
unguarded meeting. When s = ⌊r/m⌋, there are enough spies to establish a stable position
after the initial round. We show that the spies can reestablish a stable position at the end
of each round.
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Consider a stable position at the start of round t. Let X be a maximal family of disjoint
sets of m revolutionaries such that each set is located at one vertex other than u. Let Y
be such a maximal family after the revolutionaries move in round t. In X or Y , more than
one set may be located at a single vertex in G. For example, a vertex v having pm + q
revolutionaries at the start of round t (where 0 ≤ q < m) corresponds to p elements of X ,
and there are p spies at v at that time.
Let X = {x1, . . . , xk} and Y = {y1, . . . , yk′}. Let X ′ = {xk+1, . . . , xs}, representing the
excess spies waiting at u after round t. Define an auxiliary bipartite graph H with partite
sets X ∪ X ′ and Y . For xi ∈ X and yj ∈ Y , put xiyj ∈ E(H) if some revolutionary from
meeting xi is in meeting yj (note that xi and yj may be the same set). Also make all of X
′
adjacent to all of Y . If some matching in H covers Y , then the spies can move so that every
vertex other than u having p′m+ q′ revolutionaries at the end of round t (where 0 ≤ q′ < m)
has exactly p′ spies on it (and the remaining spies are at u).
The existence of such a matching follows from Hall’s Theorem. For S ⊆ Y , always
X ′ ⊆ N(S), so |N(S)| = |X ′| + |N(S) ∩ X|. Consider the m|S| revolutionaries in the
meetings corresponding to S. Such revolutionaries came from meetings in |N(S) ∩ X| or
were not in any of the k meetings indexed by X . Hence m|S| ≤ m|N(S) ∩X| + (r − km).
Since |X ′| = s− k and s = ⌊r/m⌋,
|N(S)| ≥ |X ′|+ |S| − (⌊r/m⌋ − k) = s− k + |S| − (⌊r/m⌋ − k) = |S|,
so Hall’s Condition holds.
Corollary 2.3. Fix n,m, r with n ≥ r/m. For 0 ≤ k ≤ (n
2
)
, there is an n-vertex graph G
with k edges such that σ(G,m, r) = ⌊r/m⌋.
Proof. For k ≥ n, form G by adding the desired number of edges joining leaves of an n-
vertex star; Theorem 2.2 applies. For k ≤ n − 1, let G be a star plus isolated vertices; use
Theorem 2.2 and ⌊a⌋ + ⌊b⌋ ≤ ⌊a+ b⌋.
Definition 2.4. For any vertex v in a rooted tree, the parent of a non-root vertex v (written
v+) is the first vertex after v on the path from v to the root. The set of children of v
(written C(v)) is the set of neighbors of v other than its parent, and the set of descendants
of v (written D(v)) is the set of vertices whose path to the root contains v. A webbed tree
is a graph G having a rooted spanning tree T such that every edge of G outside T joins two
vertices having the same parent (called siblings). Figure 1 shows a webbed tree, with the
rooted spanning tree T in bold.
Trivially, every tree is a webbed tree, as is every graph having a dominating vertex. In
fact, a 2-connected graph is a webbed tree if and only if it has a dominating vertex. Every
webbed tree is a graph whose blocks have dominating vertices, but the converse does not
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hold. Consider the graph obtained from two 4-cycles with a common vertex by adding chords
of the 4-cycles to create four vertices of degree 3; every block has a dominating vertex, but
the graph is not a webbed tree.
Our main result in this section is that all webbed trees are spy-good. This conclusion
is proved for trees in [2]. In that paper, an invariant defined in terms of the positions of
the revolutionaries specifies how many spies should be placed on each vertex. The invariant
guarantees that all meetings are covered, and a direct proof is given to show that the spies
can restore the invariant after each round.
Here we use the same invariant to generalize the tree result to the class of webbed trees.
Our method of proving that the invariant has the desired properties is different from that
in [2]. Here we decompose the spies’ response into independent responses in imagined games
on subgraphs having a dominating vertex. After the revolutionaries move, the spies restore
the invariant by applying the strategy in Theorem 2.2 independently to each graph induced
by a vertex and its children in the spanning tree. Because we will apply Theorem 2.2, we
don’t use “stable” for positions satisfying the invariant in a webbed tree; instead, we reserve
that term for positions in the auxiliary local games, whose graphs have dominating vertices.
In [2], the result on trees is extended in a different direction to determine the winner
in RS(G,m, r, s) whenever G has at most one cycle. A similar extension is possible here
for graphs obtained by adding a cycle through the roots of disjoint webbed trees, but the
resulting family is not as natural as the family of unicyclic graphs.
Theorem 2.5. If G is a webbed tree, then σ(G,m, r) = ⌊r/m⌋.
Proof. Let T be a rooted spanning tree in G such that every edge of G not in T joins sibling
vertices in T . Let z be the root of T , and let s = ⌊r/m⌋. The notation for children and
descendants is as in Definition 2.4 with respect to T .
For each vertex v, let r(v) and s(v) denote the number of revolutionaries and spies on
v at the current time, respectively, and let w(v) =
∑
u∈D(v) r(u). The spies maintain the
following invariant specifying the number of spies on each vertex at the end of any round:
s(v) =
⌊
w(v)
m
⌋
−
∑
x∈C(v)
⌊
w(x)
m
⌋
for v ∈ V (G). (1)
Since
∑
x∈C(v) w(x) = w(v) − r(v), the formula is always nonnegative. Also, if r(v) ≥ m,
then s(v) ≥
⌊
w(v)
m
⌋
−
⌊
w(v)−r(v)
m
⌋
≥ 1. Hence (1) guarantees that every meeting is guarded.
To show that the spies can establish (1) after the first round, it suffices that all the
formulas sum to ⌊r/m⌋. More generally, summing over the descendants of any vertex v,
∑
u∈D(v)
s(u) =
⌊
w(v)
m
⌋
, (2)
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since ⌊w(u)/m⌋ occurs positively in the term for u and negatively in the term for u+, except
that ⌊w(v)/m⌋ occurs only positively. When v = z, the total is ⌊r/m⌋, since w(z) = r.
To show that the spies can maintain (1), let r(v) and s(v) refer to the start of round t, let
r′(v) denote the number of revolutionaries at v after the revolutionaries move in round t, and
let w′(v) =
∑
u∈D(v) r
′(v). The spies will move in round t to achieve the new values required
by (1). To determine these moves, we will use Theorem 2.2 to obtain a stable position in
each subgraph induced by a vertex and its children, independently. Let G(v) denote the
subgraph induced by C(v) ∪ {v}; note that v is a dominating vertex in G(v). We will play
a round in an imagined “local” game on G(v) for each vertex v.
•
• • •
• • • • •
v+
v
G(v+)
G(v)
•
• • •
Figure 1: Decomposition of a webbed tree
To set up the local games, we partition the s(v) spies at each vertex v into a set of sˇ(v)
spies to be used in the local game on G(v) and a set of sˆ(v) spies to be used in the local
game on G(v+), where sˇ(v) and sˆ(v) sum to s(v) (when the tree is drawn with the root z at
the top, the accent indicates the direction of the relevant subgraph).
Let D∗(v) = D(v)−{v}. Let w∗(v) be the number of revolutionaries that are in D∗(v) at
the start of round t or are there after the revolutionaries move in round t. Every revolutionary
counted by w∗(v) is also counted by w(v), and every revolutionary counted by
∑
x∈C(v) w(x)
is also counted by w∗(v). These statements also hold with w′ in place of w. Hence
w(v) ≥ w∗(v) and w∗(v) ≥
∑
x∈C(v)
w(x). (3)
By (3), sˆ(v) and sˇ(v) are nonnegative when we define
sˆ(v) =
⌊
w(v)
m
⌋
−
⌊
w∗(v)
m
⌋
and sˇ(v) =
⌊
w∗(v)
m
⌋
−
∑
x∈C(v)
⌊
w(x)
m
⌋
. (4)
By (1), sˆ(v) + sˇ(v) = s(v). Note also that if v is a leaf of T , then sˇ(v) = 0 and sˆ(v) = s(v).
For each non-leaf vertex v, the spies first imagine positions of revolutionaries in a game
on the graph G(v) that together with (4) for the spies form a stable position. After viewing
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the actual moves by revolutionaries within G(v) as moves in this game, the spies reestablish
stability as in Theorem 2.2. We will show that the resulting positions satisfy the global
invariant. The spies imagine rˆ(v) spies at v in G(v+) and rˇ(v) spies at v in G(v), where
rˆ(v) = w(v)−m
⌊
w∗(v)
m
⌋
and rˇ(v) = w∗(v)−
∑
x∈C(v)
w(x). (5)
By (3), the values of rˇ(v) and rˆ(v) are nonnegative. Furthermore, we claim that if (4) and
(5) hold at each vertex v, then the position on each subgraph induced by one parent and
its children is stable. In G(v) we use sˇ(v) and rˇ(v), and we use sˆ(x) and rˆ(x) for x ∈ C(v).
By definition, sˆ(x) = ⌊rˆ(x)/m⌋. It remains only to check the sum. We compute the total
number of revolutionaries in the local game:
rˇ(v) +
∑
x∈C(v)
rˆ(x) = w∗(v)−
∑
x∈C(v)
w(x) +
∑
x∈C(v)
w(x)−m
∑
x∈C(v)
⌊
w∗(x)
m
⌋
Dividing by m yields w
∗(v)
m
−∑x∈C(v) ⌊w∗(x)m ⌋, whose floor is sˇ(v) +∑x∈C(v) sˆ(x), as desired.
The spies next view the actual moves by revolutionaries in the global game as moves by
the revolutionaries in the imagined local games. Each such move occurs within the subgraph
G(v) for one vertex v. The local game can model these moves if the relevant value of rˆ or
rˇ is at least the number of real revolutionaries leaving this vertex and staying within this
subgraph. The revolutionaries leaving v by edges in G(v+) are those that were in D(v) and
now are not; there are at most w(v) − w∗(v) of them. By (5), rˆ(v) is at least this large.
Similarly, revolutionaries leaving v via G(v) wind up in D∗(v) but were not there previously,
so the number of them is at most w∗(v)−∑x∈C(v) w(x), which equals rˇ(v).
The net change in the actual number of revolutionaries at v is r′(v)− r(v). Some of this
change is due to moves in G(v) and the rest to moves in G(v+). Moves in G(v+) enter or
leave D(v). Hence the net change in the number of revolutionaries at v due to such moves
is w′(v) − w(v). The remaining net change, due to moves between v and its children (in
G(v)), is (r′(v)− r(v))− (w′(v)−w(v)). Therefore, after executing the actual moves in the
imagined local games, the new imagined distributions for the revolutionaries are given by
rˆ′(v) = rˆ(v) + w′(v)− w(v) and rˇ′(v) = rˇ(v) + (r′(v)− r(v))− (w′(v)− w(v)). (6)
The specification of rˆ(v) in (5) and the change from rˆ(v) to rˆ′(v) in (6) immediately yield
the formula for rˆ′(v) in (7). To obtain rˇ′(v), start with the formula for rˇ′(v) in (5) and adjust
by the definitions of r(v)− r(v) and w′(v)− r′(v), as indicated in (6). We compute
rˇ′(v) = rˇ(v) + (w(v)− r(v))− (w′(v)− r′(v))
= w∗(v)−
∑
x∈C(v)
w(x) +
∑
x∈C(v)
w(x)−
∑
x∈C(v)
w′(x) = w∗(v)−
∑
x∈C(v)
w′(x).
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Thus
rˆ′(v) = w′(v)−m
⌊
w∗(v)
m
⌋
and rˇ′(v) = w∗(v)−
∑
x∈C(v)
w′(x). (7)
The spies now respond in the local games. By Theorem 2.2, these positions are stable,
so sˆ′(x) = ⌊rˆ′(x)/m⌋ for x ∈ C(v), and sˇ′(v) is the leftover amount for v in the local game
on G(v). By the same computation that earlier showed sˇ(v) was the correct needed amount
of spies left for v in G(v), also sˇ′(v) =
⌊
w∗(v)
m
⌋
−∑x∈C(v) ⌊w′(x)m ⌋.
Because each spy participated in exactly one local game, playing the local games inde-
pendently ensures automatically that each spy moves at most once in round t. Hence the
spy moves we have described are feasible. It remains only to show that (1) holds for the
resulting distribution of spies; that is
sˆ′(v) + sˇ′(v) =
⌊
w′(v)
m
⌋
−
∑
x∈C(v)
⌊
w′(x)
m
⌋
for v ∈ V (G).
Since the terms involving w∗ again cancel, we use (7) to show that sˆ′(v) + sˇ′(v) equals the
desired value s′(v) in the same way we used (5) to show that the invented values sˆ(v) and
sˇ(v) sum to s(v).
3 Spy-good vs. Spy-bad
It is not true that all spy-good graphs are webbed trees. Given G, let Gk denote the graph
defined by V (Gk) = V (G) and E(Gk) = {uv : dG(u, v) ≤ k}. The spies can simulate one
round of the game on Gk by playing k rounds on G. Thus σ(Gk, m, r) ≤ σ(G,m, r), as noted
by Howard and Smyth [4]. This makes the square of a webbed tree spy-good, even though
it is not generally a webbed tree (consider G = Pn, for example).
Say that a spy strategy is conformal if at the end of each round the number of spies at
each vertex v is at least ⌊r(v)/m⌋, where r(v) is the number of revolutionaries there. For any
conformal spy strategy on G, the strategy described above for Gk is also conformal. Another
graph operation also preserves the existence of conformal strategies.
Proposition 3.1. Obtain G′ from a graph G by expanding a vertex of G into a clique. If
⌊r/m⌋ spies win RS(G,m, r, s) by a conformal strategy, then the same holds for G′.
Proof. Let Q be the clique into which vertex v of G is expanded to form G′. The spies play
on G′ by imagining a game on G. At each round, the revolutionaries on Q in G′ are collected
onto v in G, with r(v) there after the previous round and r′(v) after the revolutionaries
move. For other vertices, the amounts before and after are as in the real game on G′.
Since
∑ ⌊ai⌋ ≤ ⌊∑ ai⌋, the spies on v at the end of the round in G suffice to cover the
r′(v) revolutionaries on Q in G and can move there, since all vertices of Q have the same
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neighbors outside Q that v has in G. Extra spies move to any vertex of Q. Movements of
spies from v in G can also be matched by moves in the game on G′. Other movements are
the same in G and G′. This produces a conformal strategy on G′.
Proposition 3.2. On a webbed tree G, the winning strategy in Theorem 2.5 is conformal.
Proof. Let T be a rooted spanning tree such that edges outside T join siblings in T . After
each round, the number of spies on vertex v is given by⌊
r(v) +
∑
x∈C(v) w(x)
m
⌋
−
∑
x∈C(v)
⌊
w(x)
m
⌋
.
Since
∑ ⌊ai⌋ ≤ ⌊∑ ai⌋, the strategy is conformal.
These results imply that graphs obtained from webbed trees by vertex expansions and
distance powers are spy-good. For example, the square of a path is spy-good. This graph
is not a webbed tree, since it is 2-connected but has no dominating vertex (when it has at
least six vertices). On the other hand, it is an interval graph, where an interval graph is a
graph representable by assigning each vertex v an interval on the real line so that vertices are
adjacent if and only if their intervals intersect. An interval graph that is not a distance power
and has no two vertices with the same closed neighborhood is obtained from the square of
an 8-vertex path by adding an edge joining the third and sixth vertices.
Question 3.3. Which graphs are spy-good?
We believe that all interval graphs are spy-good, even though the class is not contained
in the spy-good classes obtained above.
Although not all graphs are spy-good, Theorem 2.2 yields good upper bounds on
σ(G,m, r) for graphs with small dominating sets. A dominating set in a graph G is a
set S ⊆ V (G) such that every vertex outside S has a neighbor in S; the domination number
γ(G) is the minimum size of a dominating set in G.
Corollary 3.4. σ(G,m, r) ≤ γ(G) ⌊r/m⌋ for any graph G.
Proof. Let S be a smallest dominating set. With each vertex u ∈ S, associate ⌊r/m⌋ spies.
Let Gu be the subgraph of G induced by N [u]; it has u as a dominating vertex. The spies
associated with u stay in Gu, following the strategy of Theorem 2.2 on Gu. When there are
fewer than r revolutionaries in Gu, the spies imagine that the missing ones are at u. When a
real revolutionary comes to vertex v in Gu from outside Gu, a revolutionary in the imagined
game moves from u to v to perform its moves. When the real revolutionary leaves Gu, the
revolutionary tracking it in the game on Gu returns to u. These moves are possible, since u
is a dominating vertex in Gu. Since the spies win each imagined game, the revolutionaries
in the real game never make an unguarded meeting at the end of a round.
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As remarked in the introduction, Corollary 3.4 is of interest only when γ(G) ≤ m,
because otherwise the trivial upper bound r − m + 1 is stronger. When γ(G) ≤ m, the
bound in Corollary 3.4 cannot be improved. To motivate the proof, we first present a simple
construction of spy-bad graphs.
A split graph is a graph whose vertices can be partitioned into a clique and an independent
set. A chordal graph is a graph in which every cycle of length at least 4 has a chord; split
graphs clearly have this property. Recall that for fixed r and m a graph is spy-bad if the
revolutionaries can beat r −m spies (r −m+ 1 spies trivially win).
Proposition 3.5. Given r,m ∈ N, there is a chordal graph G (in fact a split graph) such
that σ(G,m, r) = r −m+ 1.
Proof. Let Gm,r be the split graph consisting of a clique Q of size r and an independent set
S of size
(
r
m
)
, with the neighborhoods of the vertices in S being distinct m-sets in Q. We
show that r −m spies cannot win.
The revolutionaries initially occupy each vertex of Q. Let s′ be the number of vertices of
Q initially occupied by spies. The number of threatened meetings that spies on Q are not
adjacent to is
(
r−s′
m
)
. Protecting against such threats requires putting spies initially on the(
r−s′
m
)
vertices of S corresponding to these m-sets, but only r −m − s′ remaining spies are
available, and
(
r−s′
m
)
> r −m− s′ when r − s′ ≥ m.
Note that r−m+1
r/m
can be made arbitrarily large. When r = 2m, the ratio exceeds m/2.
Letting m also grow, we observe that σ(G,m, r) cannot be bounded by a constant multiple
of r/m, even on split graphs. Furthermore, the strategy for revolutionaries in Proposition 3.5
does not use any edges within the clique, so the statement remains true also for the bipartite
graph obtained by deleting those edges.
When m grows, the degrees of all vertices in Gm,r also grow. If the degrees in the
independent set are bounded, then the spies can do better. We state the next result without
proof, because the proof is a bit technical and the class of graphs is somewhat specialized.
The technique is as usual for upper bounds: defining stable positions and showing that the
spies can reestablish a stable position after each round. The proof will appear in the thesis
of the third author.
Theorem 3.6. Let G be a split graph with clique Q and independent set S in which each
vertex of S has degree at most d. If m is a multiple of d, then σ(G,m, r) ≤ d ⌈r/m⌉.
A construction like that of Proposition 3.5 enables us to show that Corollary 3.4 is nearly
sharp. When t = m, the upper and lower bounds in this result are equal; when m | r, the
difference between them is t− 1.
Theorem 3.7. Given t,m, r ∈ N such that t ≤ m ≤ r − m, there is a graph G with
domination number t such that σ(G,m, r) > t(r/m− 1).
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Proof. First we construct a graph G. Begin with a copy of Kt,r having partite sets T of size
t and R of size r. Add an independent set U of size t
(
r
m
)
, grouped into sets of size t. With
each m-set A in R, associate one t-set A′ in U . Make all of A adjacent to all of A′, and add
a matching joining A′ to T (see Figure 2). Note that T is a dominating set.
T
A
R
|T | = t
|R| = r
U t
(
r
m
)
••
••
• • • •t
A′
t
|A| = m
Figure 2: Sharpness of the domination bound
To show that γ(G) = t, let S be a smallest dominating set. For each m-set A in R, the t
vertices in A′ are adjacent only to A in R. Thus if |S ∩ R| < t ≤ r −m, then some t-set A′
in U is undominated by S ∩R. Outside of R, the closed neighborhoods of the vertices in A′
are pairwise disjoint, so S needs t additional vertices to dominate them. Hence |S| ≥ t.
Now, we give a strategy for the revolutionaries to win against t(r/m−1) spies on G. Let
s = ⌊t(r/m− 1)⌋. The revolutionaries initially occupy R, one on each vertex. A spy on a
vertex u of U can protect all the same threats (and more) by locating at the neighbor of u
in T instead. Hence we may assume (at least for the purpose of trying to survive the next
round) that no spies locate initially in U .
Let v be a vertex of T having the fewest initial spies, and let s(v) be the number of spies
there. The revolutionaries will win by attacking the neighbors of v. Let s′ be the number of
spies initially in R, so s(v) ≤ (s− s′)/t.
The revolutionaries want to form meetings at s(v) + 1 neighbors of v that are neighbors
of no other vertices with spies. Let R′ be the set of vertices in R that do not have spies;
note that |R′| ≥ r− s′. If |R′| ≥ m(s(v) + 1), then the revolutionaries win as follows. First,
group vertices in R′ into s(v) + 1 sets of size m. For each such set A, the revolutionaries on
A move to the unique vertex uA,v in the associated subset A
′ of U that is adjacent to v in
T . For each such vertex, the only neighbor having a spy is v, so the meetings cannot all be
guarded and the revolutionaries win.
It thus suffices to show that r − s′ ≥ m(s(v) + 1). Since v has the fewest spies among
vertices of T , we have ts(v) ≤ s− s′ ≤ t(r/m− 1)− s′. Multiplying by m/t and adding m
yields m(s(v) + 1) ≤ r − s′(m/t) ≤ r − s′, as desired, using t ≤ m at the end.
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Although the construction in Theorem 3.7 depends heavily on m, it does not depend
much on r. Indeed, the construction works equally well whenever the number of revolution-
aries is at most r, because the revolutionaries can use the strategy for a smaller number of
revolutionaries on the appropriate subgraph of the graph constructed for r revolutionaries.
The same comment applies to Proposition 3.5.
4 Hypercubes and Retracts
For d ∈ N, let [d] = {1, . . . , d}. The d-dimensional hypercube Qd is the graph with vertex
set {vS : S ⊆ [d]} such that vS and vT are adjacent when the symmetric difference of S and
T has size 1. The weight of the vertex vS is |S|. For vertices of small weight, we write the
subscripts without set brackets. We show first that Qd is spy-bad for m = 2 when d ≥ r.
For larger m, we will later obtain a lower bound on σ(Qd, m, r) using the same basic idea.
Theorem 4.1. If G = Qd and d ≥ r, then σ(G, 2, r) = r − 1.
Proof. The upper bound is trivial; we show that r− 2 spies cannot win. The revolutionaries
begin by occupying v1, . . . , vr, threatening meetings of size 2 at ∅ and at
(
r
2
)
vertices of
weight 2. Let t be the number of revolutionaries left uncovered by the initial placement of
the spies. Threats at
(
t
2
)
vertices must be watched by spies not on vertices of weight 1. A
spy at a vertex of weight 2 can watch one such threat; spies at vertices of weight 3 can watch
three of them. Hence s ≥ (r − t) + 1
3
(
t
2
)
if the spies stop the revolutionaries from winning
on the first round. This yields s ≥ r − 1 if t ≥ 5 or t ≤ 2.
If t = 4 and s = r−2, then the spies need to watch six threats at weight 2 using two spies
at vertices of weight 3. A spy at a vertex of weight 3 watches the three pairs in its name. The
four uncovered revolutionaries threaten meetings at six vertices of weight 3 corresponding to
the edges of the complete graph K4. A spy at weight 3 can watch three pairs corresponding
to a triangle. Since the edges of K4 cannot be covered with two triangles, r− 2 spies are not
enough when t = 4.
If t = 3, then the counting bound yields s ≥ r − 2 for spies to avoid losing on the first
round. If the initial placement of r − 2 spies can watch all immediate threats, then they
must cover r − 3 revolutionaries at vertices of weight 1 and occupy one vertex at weight 3.
By symmetry, we may assume the spies locate at v123 and v4, . . . , vr.
In the first round, revolutionaries at v1 and v2 move to v∅; the others wait where they
are. To guard the meeting at v∅, a spy at some vertex of weight 1 must move there; let vj
be the vertex from which a spy moves to v∅.
In the second round, the revolutionaries at v3 and vj move to v3j , winning. The distance
from each spy to v3j after round 1 is at least 3, except for the spy at vj , so no other spy
could have moved after round 1 to watch that threat.
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Extra spies on vertices of weight at least 5 cannot prevent the revolutionaries from win-
ning with the strategy given in the proof of Theorem 4.1. This enables the revolutionaries
to win against somewhat fewer spies when r is larger than the dimension.
A code with length d and distance k is a set of vertices in Qd such that the distance
between any two of them is at least k. Let A(d, k) denote the maximum size of a code with
distance k in Qd, and let B(d, k) be the number of vertices with distance less than k from a
fixed vertex in Qd. Note that B(d, k) =
∑k−1
i=0
(
d
i
)
< dk−1 when k > 2. If M < 2d/B(d, k),
then any code of size M having distance k can be extended by adding some vertex, so
A(d, k) ≥ 2d/dk−1 when k > 2.
Corollary 4.2. If d < r ≤ 2d/d7, then σ(Qd, 2, r) ≥ (d− 1) ⌊r/d⌋.
Proof. Let X be a code in Qd with distance 9 and size at least 2
d/d8. The revolutionaries
devote d revolutionaries to playing the strategy in the proof of Theorem 4.1 at each of ⌊r/d⌋
vertices of X . If the ball of radius 4 at any such vertex has fewer than d − 1 spies in the
initial configuration, then the revolutionaries win in that ball in two rounds, since any spy
initially outside that ball is too far away to guard a meeting formed at distance 2 from the
central point in round 2.
Since the code has distance 9, the balls of radius 4 are disjoint. Hence (d− 1) ⌊r/d⌋ spies
are needed to keep the revolutionaries from winning within two rounds.
Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 4.2 together imply that at least (d−1) ⌊r/d⌋ spies are needed
to win against r revolutionaries on Qd unless d < log2 r+7 log2 log2 r. That many spies may
not be enough, since three revolutionaries easily defeat one spy on Q2 by starting initially
at distinct vertices. Although four revolutionaries can threaten meetings at all eight vertices
of Q3, two spies can watch all those meetings and survive the next round. It appears that
σ(Q3, 2, 4) = 2, though we have not worked out a complete strategy for two spies against
four revolutionaries. We have no nontrivial general upper bounds on σ(Qd, 2, r) when r > d.
Next we consider the game on hypercubes when m > 2. Again we use the threats made
by revolutionaries placed initially at vertices of weight 1. However, for larger m we use a
probabilistic argument instead of explicit counting. The probabilistic arguments are simpler
and yield a stronger lower bound on σ(Qd, m, r) than the counting arguments would, but
we no longer completely determine the threshold (and hence we separate this from the case
m = 2). Again V (Qd) = {vS : S ⊆ [d]}, as specified as before Theorem 4.1.
Lemma 4.3. For v ∈ V (Qd), a vertex u of weight m is within distance m − 1 of v if and
only if |u ∩ v| ≥ |v|+1
2
.
Proof. The distance between any two vertices is their symmetric difference. Always the
size of the symmetric difference is |u| + |v| − 2 |u ∩ v|. When |u| = m, it follows that
dQd(u, v) ≤ m− 1 is equivalent to |u ∩ v| ≥ |v|+12 .
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Our main tool for the game on Qd is a lemma about families of sets.
Lemma 4.4. Let S be a set of at most t vertices in Qt, all having weight at least 2. If
t ≥ 38.73m, then Qt has a vertex w of weight m such that dQt(v, w) ≥ m for all v ∈ S.
Proof. Fix p ∈ (0, 1), to be determined later. Construct a random index set I ⊆ [t] by
independently including each element of [t] with probability p. In light of Lemma 4.3, for
v ∈ S we say that I avoids v if |v ∩ I| < |v|+1
2
. Our goal is to show that with p chosen
appropriately, with positive probability I avoids all of S and has size at least m. The desired
vertex w can then be any vertex of weight m contained in such a set I. Our first task is to
obtain a lower bound on P[Av], where Av is the event that I avoids v.
Let Bin(n, p) denote a random variable having the binomial distribution with n trials and
success probability p. Let B be the event that 2k+1 trials yield k successes in the first 2k−1
trials plus two failures at the end. Let B′ be the event that 2k+1 trials yield k−1 successes in
the first 2k−1 trials plus two successes at the end. Canceling common factors yields P[B] >
P[B′] if and only if p < 1/2. As a consequence, P[Bin(2k+1, p) < k+1] > P[Bin(2k−1, p) < k]
when p < 1/2. Note also that P[Bin(2k − 2, p) < k] ≥ P[Bin(2k − 1, p) < k].
Now let k =
⌈
|v|+1
2
⌉
, so k ≥ 2 and |v| ∈ {2k − 2, 2k − 1}. For the event that I has fewer
than k elements of v, our observations about the binomial distribution yield
P[Av] ≥ P[Bin(2k − 1, p) < k] ≥ P[Bin(3, p) < 2] = (1− p)2(1 + 2p).
Let q = minv P[Av]. Events of the form Av are down-sets in the subset lattice. By
the FKG inequality (see Theorem 6.2.1 of Alon and Spencer [1]), such events are positively
correlated when p < 1/2, so
P
[⋂
v∈S
Av
]
≥ qt = et ln q.
Now let X = |I|. For m ≤ αtp with α < 1, Chernoff’s Inequality yields
P[X < m] = P[X − tp < m− tp] ≤ e−(m−tp)2/(2tp) = e−(1−α)2tp/2.
Our goal is to show P
[⋂
v∈S Av
]
> P[X < m], which follows from
ln[(1− p)2(1 + 2p)] > −(1 − α)2p/2.
With α = .324722 and p = .079532, the strict inequality holds, and we obtain αp ≈ .0258259.
Hence when d ≥ m/(αp) ≥ 38.73m, some m-set avoids all vertices in S.
Before we apply this lemma to the game on the hypercube, we prove a general result
that relates the game on a graph and its retracts. The notion of retract appeared as early as
Hell [3], as a homomorphism fixing a subgraph. The variation from [6] that we use becomes
the homomorphism version when loops are available at all vertices.
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Definition 4.5. An induced subgraph H of a graph G is a retract of G if there is a map
f : V (G) → V (H) such that (1) f(v) = v for v ∈ V (H), and (2) uv ∈ E(G) implies that
f(u) and f(v) are equal or adjacent.
Nowakowski and Winkler [6] proved a theorem for the classical cop-and-robber pursuit
game that is analogous to our next result.
Theorem 4.6. Let H be a retract of a graph G. If the revolutionaries win RS(H,m, r, s),
then the revolutionaries win RS(G,m, r, s). Equivalently, σ(G,m, r) ≥ σ(H,m, r).
Proof. Let f : G → H be as guaranteed in Definition 4.5. The revolutionaries play in G
by playing exclusively on H , using the map f to play as if the spies in V (G) − V (H) were
actually in V (H).
The revolutionaries take initial positions as specified by their winning strategy on H .
They simulate a spy on v ∈ V (G) by a spy on f(v) ∈ V (H). Whenever a spy can legally
move from u to v in G, the definition of retract guarantees that the simulated spy can
move from f(u) to f(v) in H . Therefore, the simulated spies always play legal moves in the
imagined game. The revolutionaries play their winning strategy against the simulated spies
in H and eventually form an uncovered meeting at some vertex w. Since f(w) = w, the
absence of a simulated spy on w means that there is no real spy on w, and the revolutionaries
have won the “real game” in G.
Theorem 4.7. If s ≤ r − 38.73m and d ≥ r, then the revolutionaries win RS(Qd, m, r, s).
Proof. The revolutionaries initially occupy v1, . . . , vr. The revolutionaries threaten meetings
after m − 1 steps at ( r
m
)
vertices of weight m. The vertices of weight m protected by a
spy at vi are precisely those whose corresponding sets contain i. Let t be the number of
revolutionaries uncovered after the initial placement of spies. By symmetry, we may assume
that the uncovered revolutionaries are at v1, . . . , vt. Let S be the set of spies initially on
vertices having weight at least 2; only such spies can protect vertices in the set of
(
t
m
)
vertices
of weight m above uncovered revolutionaries. Note that 0 ≤ |S| ≤ s− (r− t) ≤ t− 38.73m,
and hence t ≥ 38.73m.
Every subcube of Qd is a retract of Qd, by projection. Hence by Theorem 4.6, we may
assume that the spies in S are all inQt. We can therefore apply Lemma 4.4. With t ≥ 38.73m
and |S| ≤ t− 38.73m < t, some vertex of weight m in Qt is too far from S to be reached by
any spy within m− 1 rounds, and the revolutionaries win.
Although |S| ≤ t− 38.73m in Theorem 4.7 while Lemma 4.4 allows |S| ≤ t, generalizing
the lemma to vary |S| in terms of t does not noticeably strengthen the application.
When t ≥ 2m, an explicit counting bound on the number of vertices of weight m in Qt
that are within distance m− 1 of a given vertex of S leads to the following theorem.
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Theorem 4.8. If d ≥ r ≥ m ≥ 3 and s ≤ r − 3
4
m2, then the revolutionaries win
RS(Qd, m, r, s), so σ(Qd, m, r) > r − 34m2.
Theorem 4.8 is stronger than Theorem 4.7 when m ≤ 52. We omit the proof, because
the proofs of this counting lemma and theorem are longer and more technical than those
of Lemma 4.4 and Theorem 4.7, and because we believe that the revolutionaries may win
against as many as r − 2m spies.
As in Theorem 4.1, the revolutionaries in Theorem 4.7 play locally, winning by staying
within distance m of a fixed vertex. Hence with general meeting size m we can apply the
same coding theory argument as in Corollary 4.2. Given a code with distance 4m − 1, the
balls of radius 2m − 1 are disjoint. Any vertex with distance more than 2m − 1 from the
central point has distance more than m− 1 from the threatened meetings and cannot reach
them in m − 1 turns, which is the number of rounds the revolutionaries need to win in the
strategy of Theorem 4.7. We thus have the following.
Corollary 4.9. If d < r ≤ 2d/d4m, then σ(Qd, m, r) > (d− 38m) ⌊r/d⌋.
Finally, the hypercube result applies to more general cartesian products via the notion
of retract. For U ⊆ V (G), we use G[U ] to denote the subgraph of G induced by U .
Corollary 4.10. Let G = G1 · · ·Gd, where G1, . . . , Gd are graphs with at least one edge.
If the revolutionaries win RS(Qd, m, r, s), then the revolutionaries win RS(G,m, r, s).
Proof. By Theorem 4.6, it suffices to show that G contains a retract isomorphic to Qd. Select
viwi ∈ E(Gi) for each i, and let U = {v1, w1} × · · · × {vd, wd}. Note that G[U ] ∼= Qd.
To define f : V (G)→ U , first define gi : V (Gi)→ {vi, wi} by setting gi(x) = vi if x = vi
and gi(x) = wi otherwise. Now let f(x1, . . . , xd) = (g1(x1), . . . , gd(xd)). Clearly f fixes U .
If xy ∈ E(G), then there exists exactly one i such that xi 6= yi; without loss of generality,
xi 6= vi. If also yi 6= vi, then gi(xi) = gi(yi) = wi, so f(x) = f(y).
On the other hand, if yi = vi, then gi(xi) = wi and gi(yi) = vi while gj(xj) = gj(yj) for
all j 6= i, so f(x)f(y) ∈ E(G[U ]) since wivi ∈ E(G). Therefore f satisfies the conditions in
Definition 4.5, and G[U ] is a retract of G isomorphic to Qd.
5 Random Graphs
In the Erdo˝s–Renyi binomial model G(n, p), the vertex set is [n], pairs of vertices occur as
edges independently with probability p, and we say that an event occurs almost surely if its
probability tends to 1 as n→∞.
When the graph is randomly generated and there are not too many revolutionaries, the
revolutionaries can play a strategy like that in Proposition 3.5 to defeat r − m spies: the
revolutionaries occupy vertices so that no matter where the spies are placed, anym uncovered
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vertices can meet at some vertex adjacent to no spy. When the number of revolutionaries is
larger, also the allowed number of spies is larger; the revolutionaries no longer can find such
a placement, and the number of spies needed is only a fraction of r.
Our main task in this section is to show that for constant edge-probability p, these two
situations for the number of revolutionaries are surprisingly close together, differing only by
a constant factor. In particular, when r < ln 2 lnn the revolutionaries almost always win
agains r−m spies, and when r > cm lnn almost always cr/m spies can win, where c is any
constant greater than 4. The argument in the first setting also yields results when p depends
on n.
Independently, Mitsche and Pra lat [5] have proved that for G in G(n, p), almost surely
σ(G,m, r) ≤ r
m
+2(2+
√
2+ǫ) log1/(1−p) n; here p can depend on n (they also obtain conditions
under which r − m + 1 spies are needed). Their upper bound is sharp within an additive
constant, but also they require r to grow faster than (log n)/p. In comparison to our method,
they use more intricate structural characteristics of the random graph and a more complex
strategy for the spies. Our strategy for the spies is like that used elsewhere in this paper:
introduce a notion of “stable position” that keeps the meetings covered, and show that the
spies can maintain a stable position.
First we consider the range where r −m + 1 spies are needed. Motivated by Alon and
Spencer [1], we say that G has the r-extension property if for any disjoint T, U ⊂ V (G) with
|T |+ |U | ≤ r, there is a vertex x ∈ V (G) adjacent to all of T and none of U . We first show
why this property makes the game easy for the revolutionaries.
Proposition 5.1. If a graph G satisfies the r-extension property, and m ≤ r′ ≤ r, then G
is spy-bad for r′ revolutionaries and meeting size m.
Proof. The r′ revolutionaries initially occupy any set of r′ vertices in G. To see that r′ −m
spies cannot prevent them from winning on the first round, let U be the set occupied by the
spies, and let T be the set occupied by uncovered revolutionaries. The revolutionaries on T
win by moving to the vertex x guaranteed by the r-extension property.
Alon and Spencer [1, Theorem 10.4.5] present the result below for constant r, but the
proof holds more generally.
Theorem 5.2. Let ǫ = min{p, 1 − p}, where p is a probability that depends on n. If r =
o
(
nǫr
lnn
)
and nǫr →∞, then G(n, p) almost surely has the r-extension property (and hence is
spy-bad for all m and r′ with m ≤ r′ ≤ r).
Proof. Let G be distributed as G(n, p). Given T, U ⊂ V (G) with |T |+ |U | ≤ r, write t = |T |
and u = |U |. For x ∈ V (G)− (T ∪ U), let AT,U,x be the event that x is adjacent to all of T
and none of U ; note that P[AT,U,x] = p
t(1− p)u ≥ ǫr.
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Let AT,U be the event that AT,U,x fails for all x ∈ V (G)− (T ∪U). The events AT,U,x for
different x are determined by disjoint sets of vertex pairs, so P[AT,U ] ≤ (1−ǫr)n−r ≤ e−ǫr(n−r).
The r-extension property fails if and only if some event of the form AT,U occurs. Hence
it suffices to show that the probability of their union tends to 0. There are 3r ways to form
T and U within a fixed r-set of vertices, since a vertex can be in either set or be omitted,
and there are
(
n
r
)
sets of size r. Hence the union consists of at most (3n)r events, each of
whose probability is at most e−ǫ
r(n−r). We compute
(3n)re−ǫ
r(n−r) = er ln(3n)−ǫ
r(n−r) = er ln 3+r lnn−ǫ
r(n−r).
Since ǫ ≤ 1/2, the condition r = o ( nǫr
lnn
)
implies r = o(n), so the exponent is dominated
by −nǫr and tends to −∞. Thus the bound on the probability of lacking the r-extension
property tends to 0, and G(n, p) almost surely satisfies this property.
In particular, when p is constant, G(n, p) is almost surely spy-bad for r ≥ m when
r ≤ c lnn, where c < ln(1/ǫ). Similarly, when r is constant, G(n, p) is almost surely spy-bad
when p tends to 0 more slowly than 1/n1/r. With p ≤ 1/2, the key condition is npr →∞.
Now we confine our attention to the realm of constant edge-probability p and consider
well-known properties of the random graph that enable the spies to do well. For every vertex,
the expected degree is p(n− 1), and for any two vertices the expected size of their common
neighborhood is p2(n− 2). Moreover, these random variables are so highly concentrated at
their expectations that almost always the degrees of all vertices and the sizes of common
neighborhoods of all pairs are within constant factors of their expected values. We begin by
stating this formally; the proofs are standard and straightforward using the Chernoff Bound.
We treat G as a sample from the model G(n, p).
Lemma 5.3. Fix p and γ with 0 < γ < p < 1. In the random graph model G(n, p), almost
surely (p − γ)n < d(v) < (p + γ)n and (p2 − γ2)n < |N(v) ∩N(w)| < (p2 + γ2)n for all
v, w ∈ V (G).
Lemma 5.4. Fix p and γ with 0 < γ < p < 1. In the random graph model G(n, p), almost
surely |N(v)∩N(w)||N(v)| ≥ p− γ for all v, w ∈ V (G).
Proof. Using the lower bound on common neighborhood size and the upper bound on degree
from Lemma 5.3, almost surely |N(v)∩N(w)||N(v)| ≥ (p
2−γ2)n
(p+γ)n
= p− γ for all v, w ∈ V (G).
Definition 5.5. For q ∈ (0, 1), a graph G is q-common if |N(v)∩N(w)||N(v)| ≥ q for all v, w ∈ G.
We develop a strategy for spies that will be successful on q-common graphs under certain
conditions. In a game position, we need to distinguish players occupied in forming or covering
meetings from those who are not. These notions will also be important for spy strategies on
complete multipartite or bipartite graphs.
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Definition 5.6. Given a game position, say that m specified revolutionaries in a meeting
and one spy covering them are bound. After designating the bound players for all vertices
hosting meetings, the remaining spies and revolutionaries are free. A vertex having at least
m revolutionaries has exactly m bound revolutionaries.
For a vertex subset U , let rU and rˆU denote the total number of revolutionaries and
number of free revolutionaries on U . Similarly, let sU and sˆU denote the total number of
spies and number of free spies on U . Write rˆ and sˆ for rˆV (G) and sˆV (G). A game position is
stable if (1) all meetings are covered, and (2) sˆN [v] ≥ rˆ/m for all v ∈ V (G).
As in Section 2, the name stable is motivated by permitting the game to continue.
Lemma 5.7. On any graph G, if the position at the beginning of a round is stable, then the
spies can respond to cover all meetings at the end of the round.
Proof. Let the notation in Definition 5.6 refer to the counts at the beginning of round t, in a
stable position. LetX be the set of distinct vertices hosting meetings after the revolutionaries
move in round t. Let Y be the set of spies. Define an auxiliary bipartite graph H with partite
sets X and Y . For x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , put xy ∈ E(H) if spy y can reach x from its position
at the start of round t, being adjacent to x or already there. If some matching in H covers
X , then the spies can move in round t to cover all the meetings.
It suffices to show that H satisfies Hall’s Condition for a matching that covers X . Con-
sider S ⊆ X . If NG[S] contains b vertices that hosted meetings at the start of round t, then
|S| ≤ rˆ+mb
m
meetings, because revolutionaries who were in meetings not in NG[S] cannot
reach S in one move. On the other hand, every free spy at a vertex of NG[S] can reach S in
one move, as can every spy bound to a meeting in S. Choosing x ∈ S, we have
|NH(S)| ≥ sˆN [v] + b ≥ rˆ/m+ b ≥ |S|.
Hence Hall’s Condition is satisfied and the matching exists.
The next lemma provides the second half of what the spies need to do.
Lemma 5.8. Let G be a q-common graph with n vertices, and fix ǫ > 0. Given a po-
sition in RS(G,m, r, s) such that (1) all meetings are covered, (2) sˆ ≥ 1+ǫ
q
rˆ
m
, and (3)
sˆ ≥ lnn
2(1−1/(1+ǫ))2q2 , the free spies can move to produce a stable postion.
Proof. We prove that if each free spy moves to a uniformly random vertex in the neighbor-
hood of its current position, then with positive probability a stable position is produced.
For v ∈ V (G), let Xv be the number of spies in N [v] after the frees spies move. Since G
is q-common, each free spy lands in N [v] with probability at least q. Also, these events for
individual spies are independent, so Xv is a sum of sˆ independent indicator variables, each
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with success probability at least q. By the Chernoff Bound, P[Xv − E[Xv] < −a] < e−2a2/sˆ
for any positive a. Since E[Xv] ≥ qsˆ, taking a =
(
1− 1
1+ǫ
)
qsˆ yields
P
[
Xv <
1
1 + ǫ
qsˆ
]
< e−2(1−
1
1+ǫ)
2
q2sˆ = e− lnn = 1/n,
where the simplification of the exponent uses hypothesis (3).
Since G has n vertices, with positive probability each vertex receives at least 1
1+ǫ
qsˆ free
spies in its neighborhood. By condition (2), this quantity is at least rˆ/m. Hence there is
some move by the free spies after which each closed neighborhood has at least rˆ/m free spies,
making the position stable.
Theorem 5.9. Let G be a q-common graph with n vertices, and fix ǫ > 0. If s ≥ 1+ǫ
q
r
m
and
s ≥ r
m
+ lnn
2(1−1/(1+ǫ))2q2 , then the spies win RS(G,m, r, s).
Proof. If they can producing a stable position via the initial placements, the spies use the
following strategy in each subsequent round to produce a stable position. In Phase 1, they
cover all meetings by moving the fewest possible spies. In Phase 2, they move the spies who
are then free to produce a stable position.
Since every spy moved in Phase 1 covers a meeting (by the condition of moving the
fewest spies), this strategy never moves a spy twice in one round. Since the position at
the beginning of the round is stable, Lemma 5.7 implies that spies can move to cover all
meetings. Hence Phase 1 can be performed. (Also, in the initial placement the spies can
start by covering all meetings, since s ≥ r/m.)
If sˆ is now large enough to satisfy the hypotheses of Lemma 5.8, then the free spies
can complete Phase 2. This argument is also used to complete the initial placement: after
covering the initial meetings, the free spies imagine being at an arbitrary vertex, and then
Lemma 5.8 guarantees that they can “move” (that is, be placed) to satisfy the neighborhood
requirement for stability.
Consider the position after Phase 1; all meetings are covered. Since at most r/m spies
can be bound, the second assumed lower bound on s yields sˆ ≥ s− r
m
≥ lnn
2(1−1/(1+ǫ))2q2 .
Finally, we use the given lower bound s ≤ 1+ǫ
q
r
m
to obtain the needed lower bound
sˆ ≤ 1+ǫ
q
rˆ
m
that completes the hypotheses of Lemma 5.8. Let r denote the number of bound
revolutionaries at the start of the round. Since q < 1 < 1 + ǫ, we have
sˆ = s− r
m
≥ 1 + ǫ
q
r
m
− 1 + ǫ
q
r
m
=
1 + ǫ
q
rˆ
m
.
We have shown that Phase 1 and Phase 2 can be completed to maintain a stable position
after each round.
Theorem 5.10. Fix p and q with 0 < q < p < 1. In the random graph model G(n, p), almost
always G has the following property for all m ∈ N: if s ≥ 1+ǫ
q
r
m
and s ≥ r
m
+ lnn
2(1−1/(1+ǫ))2q2 ,
then the spies win RS(G,m, r, s).
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Proof. By Lemma 5.4, almost always G is q-common. By Theorem 5.9, the spies win in the
given parameter range on every q-common graph.
Since 1/q > 1, the next hypotheses imply the hypotheses of Theorem 5.10.
Corollary 5.11. For p, q, G as above, almost surely G has the following property for all
m ∈ N: if s ≥ 1+ǫ
q
r
m
and r ≥ (1+ǫ)2m lnn
2ǫ3q
, then the spies win RS(G,m, r, s).
In particular, for the random graph with p = 1/2, setting ǫ = 1 and letting q approach
1/2 from below yields the following simply-stated corollary.
Corollary 5.12. Almost every graph G has the following property for all m ∈ N and c > 4:
if s ≥ c r
m
and r ≥ cm lnn, then the spies win RS(G,m, r, s).
For sparse graphs, as p→ 0, we also need q → 0, and the needed number of revolutionaries
to apply our method grows at a faster rate than m lnn. Hence for sparse graphs we do not
obtain the conclusion that the ranges for r where the needed number of spies behaves like
cr/m or like r −m are close together.
6 Complete k-partite Graphs
In this section we obtain lower and upper bounds on σ(G,m, r) when G is a complete k-
partite graph. The lower bound requires partite sets large enough so that the revolutionaries
can always access as many vertices in each part as they might want (enough to “swarm”
to distinct vertices there that avoid all the spies). The upper bounds apply more generally;
they do not require large partite sets, and they require only a spanning k-partite subgraph
(if there are additional edges within parts, then spies will be able to follow revolutionaries
along them when needed).
Definition 6.1. A complete k-partite graph G is r-large if every part has at least 2r vertices.
At the revolutionaries’ turn on such a graph, an i-swarm is a move in which the revolution-
aries make as many new meetings of size m as possible in part i. All revolutionaries outside
part i move to part i, greedily filling uncovered partial meetings to size m and then mak-
ing additional meetings of size m from the remaining incoming revolutionaries. When G is
r-large, sufficient vertices are available in part i to permit this.
Theorem 6.2. Let G be an r-large complete k-partite graph. If k ≥ m, then σ(G,m, r) ≥
k
k−1
k⌊r/k⌋
m+c
− k, where c = 1/(k − 1). When k | r the bound simplifies to k
k−1
r
m+c
− k.
Proof. We may assume that k | r, since otherwise the revolutionaries can play the strategy
for the next lower multiple of k, ignoring the extra revolutionaries.
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Let t = r/k. The revolutionaries initially occupy t distinct vertices in each part. Let si
be the initial number of spies in part i. We may assume that they cover min{si, t} distinct
revolutionaries, since each vertex of part i has the same neighborhood, and within part i
these are the best locations. We compute the number of spies needed to avoid losing by a
swarm on round 1.
Case 1: si > t for some i. If the revolutionaries swarm to part i, then all revolutionaries
previously in part i are covered, so new meetings consist entirely of incoming revolutionaries
and are not coverable by spies from part i. Since (k − 1)t revolutionaries arrive, at least
⌊(k − 1)t/m⌋ spies must arrive from other parts to cover the new meetings. Thus
s ≥ si +
⌊
(k − 1)t
m
⌋
≥ t
(
1 +
k − 1
m
)
=
k − 1 +m
k
r
m
.
Case 2: si ≤ t for all i. For each i, part i has t− si partial meetings. Since si ≥ 0, an
i-swarm is guaranteed to fill them if (k−1)t ≥ t(m−1), which holds when k ≥ m. Hence the
new meetings include all revolutionaries except the si covered by spies in part i before the
swarm. Spies from other parts must cover ⌊(r − si)/m⌋ new meetings in part i. Summing
s− si ≥ (r − si −m+ 1)/m over all parts yields (k − 1 + 1/m)s ≥ k(r −m+ 1)/m, so
s ≥ k(r −m+ 1)
m(k − 1) + 1 >
k
k − 1
r
m+ c
− k.
The lower bound in Case 2 is smaller (better for spies) than the lower bound in Case 1,
so the spies will prefer to play that way. The lower bound in Case 2 is thus a lower bound
on σ(G,m, r).
As in Section 5, our strategy for spies maintains a “stable position”, defined by invariants
ensuring that the spies can cover all meetings and reestablish a stable position. Indeed, for
complete multipartite graphs the notion of stable position is very similar to what it was in
the random graph.
Definition 6.3. Define bound and free revolutionaries and spies as in Definition 5.6. Let
rˆi and sˆi denote the numbers of free revolutionaries and free spies in part i in the current
position of a game on a complete k-partite graph. Let rˆ and sˆ denote the total numbers of
free revolutionaries and free spies. A game position is stable if (1) all meetings are covered,
and (2) sˆ− sˆi ≥ rˆ/m for each part i.
Since the neighborhood of a vertex in a complete multipartite graph consists of all the
partite sets not containing it, for such a graph G the condition for a stable position is the
same as it was in Section 5.
Lemma 6.4. Let G be a graph having a spanning complete k-partite subgraph G′. If the
position at the start of round t is stable for G′, then the revolutionaries cannot win in the
current round on G. (As always, assume s ≥ ⌊r/m⌋.)
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Proof. We follow the argument of Lemma 5.7 and hence summarize the steps. The designa-
tion of and notation for free and bound players is as of the start of round t. Let X be the
set of distinct vertices hosting meetings after the revolutionaries move in round t, let Y be
the set of spies, and let H be the bipartite graph H with partite sets X and Y that encodes
which spies can move to cover which meetings.
We show thatH satisfies Hall’s Condition for a matching that covers X . Consider S ⊆ X .
Note that |X| ≤ ⌊r/m⌋ ≤ s. If S has vertices from more than one partite set in G′, then
|NH(S)| = s ≥ |X|.
If S has vertices only from part i in G′, then we may assume that no vertices of S
correspond to old meetings, since they would remain covered by their bound spies. Let p be
the number of vertices in NG′ [S] hosting meetings at the start of round t. By stability, these
vertices have bound spies, which lie in NH(S). Stability also guarantees sˆ− sˆi ≥ rˆ/m, and
all of the free spies counted by sˆ − sˆi are also in NH(S). No spy is both free and bound,
so |NH(S)| ≥ p + rˆ/m. On the other hand, the number of revolutionaries that can be used
to make meetings in S is at most rˆ + pm, since only m revolutionaries at a vertex having a
meeting are bound; the rest are free. Hence |S| ≤ rˆ+pm
m
≤ |NH(S)|, as desired.
Theorem 6.5. If a graph G has a spanning complete k-partite subgraph, then σ(G,m, r) ≤⌈
k
k−1
r
m
⌉
+ k.
Proof. Let G′ be the specified subgraph, and let s =
⌈
k
k−1
r
m
⌉
+ k. It suffices to show that s
spies can produce a stable position at the end of each round. First, after the revolutionaries
have moved, the spies cover all newly created meetings, moving the fewest possible spies
to do so. By Lemma 6.4, the spies can do this since the previous round ended in a stable
position (also, s ≥ ⌊r/m⌋ guarantees that the spies can do this in the initial position).
Next, the spies that are now free distribute themselves equally among the k parts of G′.
More precisely, with sˆ being the total number of free spies after the new meetings are covered
and sˆi being the number of them in part i, we have |sˆi − sˆ/k| < 1 for all i.
It suffices to show that this second step produces a stable position. In order to have
sˆ − sˆi ≥ rˆ/m for all i, it suffices to have sˆj ≥ rˆ/[m(k − 1)] for each j. Since the free spies
are distributed equally, it suffices for the average to be big enough: sˆ/k ≥ rˆ/[m(k − 1)] + 1.
Multiplying by k, we require sˆ ≥ k
k−1
rˆ
m
+ k.
We are given s ≥ k
k−1
r
m
+k. The number of bound revolutionaries is exactly m times the
number of bound spies; hence s − sˆ = (r − rˆ)/m. Subtracting this equality from the given
inequality yields
sˆ ≥ 1
k − 1
r
m
+
rˆ
m
+ k ≥ k
k − 1
rˆ
m
+ k,
where the last inequality uses r ≥ rˆ. We now have the inequality that we showed suffices for
a stable position.
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7 Complete Bipartite Graphs
Finally, let G be an r-large bipartite graph. We give lower and upper bounds on σ(G,m, r)
for fixed m. The lower bounds use strategies for the revolutionaries that win after one or
two rounds, while the upper bounds use more delicate strategies for the spies (maintaining
invariants that prevent the revolutionaries from winning on the next round).
Since the lower bounds are much easier, we start with them, but first we compare all the
bounds in Table 1. When 3 | m, the lower bound is roughly 3
2
r/m. We believe that this
is the asymptotic answer when 3 | m. When 3 ∤ m, the revolutionaries cannot employ this
strategy quite so efficiently, which leaves an opening for the spies to do better. Indeed, for
m = 2, the answer is roughly 7
5
r/m, a bit smaller. For larger m, the relative value of this
advantage diminishes, and we expect the leading coefficient to tend to 3/2 as m→∞.
Table 1: Bounds on σ(G,m, r)
Meeting size Lower bound Upper bound References
2
⌈ ⌊7r/2⌋−3
5
⌉ ⌈ ⌊7r/2⌋−3
5
⌉
Theorems 7.2 and 7.9
3 ⌊r/2⌋ ⌊r/2⌋ Theorems 7.3 and 7.10
m ∈ {4, 8, 10} 1
5
⌊
7r
m
− 13
2
⌋
Corollary 7.4
m
⌊
1
2
⌊
r
⌈m/3⌉
⌋⌋ (
1 + 1√
3
)
r
m
+ 1 Corollary 7.4; Theorem 7.11
We first motivate the lower bounds by giving simple strategies for the revolutionaries
when m ∈ {2, 3}. Henceforth call the partite sets X1 and X2.
Example 7.1. Initially place ⌊r/2⌋ revolutionaries in X1 and ⌈r/2⌉ revolutionaries in X2.
Regardless of where the spies sit, swarming revolutionaries can form at least ⌊(r − 1)/(2m)⌋
new meetings on either side that can only be covered by spies from the other side, so the
initial placement must satisfy s1 ≥ ⌊(r − 1)/(2m)⌋ and s2 ≥ ⌊r/(2m)⌋, where si is the
number of spies in Xi.
However, the uncovered revolutionaries can also be used to form meetings. Ifm = 2, then
the revolutionaries can form ⌊(r − si)/2⌋ meetings when swarming to Xi, so the spies lose
unless s3−i ≥ ⌊(r − si)/2⌋ for both i. Summing the inequalities yields s1 + s2 ≥ 2(r − 1)/3.
For m = 3, considering only r of the form 4k, where k ∈ N, we show that the revo-
lutionaries win against 2k − 1 spies. Initially there are 2k revolutionaries in each part, on
distinct vertices. We may assume s1 ≤ s2, so s1 ≤ k − 1. Since there are only 2k − 1 − s1
spies in X2, there are at least s1 + 1 uncovered revolutionaries in X2. Since s1 ≤ k − 1,
we can use 2(s1 + 1) revolutionaries from X1 to form meetings of size 3 with the uncovered
revolutionaries in X2. Since only s1 spies are available to cover these meetings, the spies lose.
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Thus σ(G, 3, r) ≥ r/2 when 4 | r. However, when r = 4k + 2, the revolutionaries cannot
immediately win against 2k spies by this construction. With 2k + 1 revolutionaries in each
part and k spies sitting on revolutionaries in each part, swarming revolutionaries can only
make k new meetings in either part, which can be covered by the spies.
The symmetric strategy in Example 7.1 is optimal when m = 3 and 4 | r. However,
when m = 2 and when m = 3 with r = 4k + 2, the revolutionaries can do better using an
asymmetric strategy that takes advantage of moving away from spies. When m = 3 and
r = 4k + 2, this other strategy just increases the threshold by 1, to the value ⌊r/2⌋ that we
will show is optimal for all r. For m = 2, however, the better strategy increases the leading
term from 2r/3 to 7r/10.
Recall that the partite sets are X1 and X2 and that a vertex (or meeting) is covered if
there is a spy there. Say that a spy is lonely when at a vertex with no revolutionary.
Theorem 7.2. If G is an r-large complete bipartite graph, then σ(G, 2, r) ≥ ⌈ ⌊7r/2⌋−3
5
⌉
.
Proof. We present a strategy for the revolutionaries and compute the number of spies needed
to resist it. The revolutionaries start at r distinct vertices in X1. In response, at least ⌊r/2⌋
spies must start in X1, since otherwise the revolutionaries can next make ⌊r/2⌋ meetings at
uncovered vertices in X2 and win.
In the first round, ⌊r/2⌋ revolutionaries move from X1 to X2, occupying distinct vertices.
They leave from vertices of X1 that are covered by spies (as much as possible), so after they
move at least ⌊r/2⌋ spies in X1 are lonely. Now the spies move; let si be the number of spies
in Xi after they move (for i ∈ {1, 2}). Let c be the number of revolutionaries in X1 that
are now covered by spies. Since at most s2 spies leave X1, there remain at least ⌊r/2⌋ − s2
lonely spies in X1. We conclude that c ≤ s1 − ⌊r/2⌋+ s2.
In round 2, the revolutionaries have the opportunity to swarm to X1 or X2. Since there
are ⌊r/2⌋ revolutionaries in X2, there are at most ⌊r/2⌋+ 1 uncovered revolutionaries in X1
(on distinct vertices), so swarming revolutionaries can make meetings with all but at most
1 uncovered revolutionary in X1. The revolutionaries can therefore make ⌊(r − c)/2⌋ new
meetings in X1. These meetings can only be covered by spies moving from X2, so the spies
lose unless s2 ≥ ⌊(r − c)/2⌋.
If the revolutionaries swarm to X2, then the new meetings there can only be covered by
spies coming from X1. At most s2 revolutionaries in X2 are covered by spies. Since ⌈r/2⌉
revolutionaries come from X1, they can make meetings with all uncovered revolutionaries in
X2, so the spies lose unless s1 ≥ ⌊(r − s2)/2⌋.
Adding twice the lower bound on s1 to the lower bound on s2 (with c ≤ s1−⌊r/2⌋+ s2),
s2 + 2s1 ≥ ⌊3r/2⌋ − s1 − s2 − 1
2
+ r − s2 − 1.
The inequality simplifies to 5(s1 + s2) ≥ ⌊7r/2⌋ − 3, as desired.
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The general lower bound in Corollary 7.4 uses the formula for m = 3, which we study
first. The key is that r/2 − 1 spies are not enough when r ≡ 2 mod 4; we first sketch the
idea in an easy case. Suppose that r = 4k + 2 ≡ 6 mod 12. The revolutionaries start at
distinct vertices in X1. Suppose that all s spies start in X1 and that there are enough of
them to win. In round 1, 2r/3 revolutionaries move to X2, leaving the spies in X1 lonely.
Let s2 be the number of spies that move to X2 after round 1, leaving s1 spies in X1. The
revolutionaries in X2 now can make r/3 meetings with the remaining r/3 revolutionaries in
X1, so s2 ≥ r/3. Since s2 ≤ 2k = r/2− 1, at least r/6 + 1 revolutionaries remain uncovered
in X2. The remaining r/3 revolutionaries in X1 can make meetings with r/6 of them in
round 2. Hence s1 ≥ r/6, and s = s1 + s2 ≥ r/2.
The initial placement only requires r/3 spies in X1, not r/2. We must allow for initial
placement of x spies in X2, where 0 ≤ x ≤ r/6. The x spies originally in X2 can move to X1
in round 1 and cover revolutionaries there; this prevents the revolutionaries from threatening
as many meetings by a swarm to X1. In response, fewer than 2r/3 revolutionaries move to
X2 in round 1, and yet we can guarantee more threatened meetings in the swarm to X2.
Theorem 7.3. If G is an r-large complete bipartite graph, then σ(G, 3, r) ≥ ⌊r/2⌋.
Proof. Since ⌊r/2⌋ = ⌊(r + 1)/2⌋ when r is even, and having an extra revolutionary cannot
reduce σ, it suffices to prove the lower bound when r is even. Example 7.1 proves it when
4 | r, so only the case r = 4k + 2 remains. We show that 4k + 2 revolutionaries can win
against 2k spies. Suppose that the spies can survive for two full rounds after the initial
placement.
The revolutionaries start at r distinct vertices of X1, so at least ⌊r/3⌋ spies must start in
X1. Let x be the initial number of spies in X2, with 2k − x spies in X1. Since X1 contains
at least ⌊r/3⌋ spies, x ≤ ⌈(2k − 2)/3⌉ = ⌈r/6⌉ − 1. Define j by r − x ≡ j mod 3 with
j ∈ {0, 1, 2}. In round 1, p revolutionaries move to X2, where p = 2(r − x− j)/3. Note that
p ≥ 2k − x, so all spies in X1 are now lonely. The number of revolutionaries remaining in
X1 is r − p, which equals (r + 2x+ 2j)/3.
Let si be the number of spies in Xi after the spies respond in round 1. Since at most x
spies move from X2 to X1 in round 1, the number of uncovered revolutionaries in X1 is now
at least (r − x+ 2j)/3. With p = 2(r − x− j)/3, there are enough revolutionaries in X2 to
threaten meetings at (r − x− j)/3 vertices in X1 with revolutionaries who remained there.
Hence s2 ≥ (r − x− j)/3.
Now consider a swarm to X2 in round 2. Since there were 2k − x spies in X1 initially,
the number who moved to X2 and covered revolutionaries after round 1 is at most 2k −
x. Hence round 2 starts with at least p − 2k + x uncovered revolutionaries in X2. The
r − p revolutionaries remaining in X1 move in pairs to generate meetings with uncovered
revolutionaries in X2. Note that r−p = (r+2x+2j)/3 and p−2k+x = (r+2x+6−4j)/6.
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The number of meetings that can be made in X2 (and can only be covered by the s1 spies
in X1) depends on j.
When j = 0, the number of meetings made is (r+2x)/6, so s1 ≥ (r+2x)/6, and we obtain
s2 + s1 ≥ r−x3 + r+2x6 = r/2. When j = 1, the revolutionaries can make p− 2k + x meetings
in the swarm; hence s1 ≥ (r + 2x + 2)/6, and we obtain s2 + s1 ≥ r−x−13 + r+2x+26 = r/2.
Finally, when j = 2, the same computation yields only s ≥ r−x−2
3
+ r+2x−2
6
= r/2 − 1.
However, equality holds only if all 2k − x spies initially in X1 move to X2 in round 1 to
cover revolutionaries. Only x spies remain in X1 to guard the swarm to X2 that makes
(r + 2x − 2)/6 meetings. The inequality x ≥ (r + 2x − 2)/6 requires x ≥ (r − 2)/4, but
guarding the initial position required x < r/6.
Corollary 7.4. If G is an r-large complete bipartite graph, then σ(G,m, r) ≥
⌊
1
2
⌊
r
⌈m/3⌉
⌋⌋
.
If m is even, then σ(G,m, r) ≥ 1
5
⌊
7r
m
− 13
2
⌋
.
Proof. Let m′ = ⌈m/3⌉. The revolutionaries group into cells of size m′; each cell moves
together, modeling one player in a game with meeting size 3. When three of these cells
converge to make an unguarded meeting, the revolutionaries win the original game. The r
revolutionaries make ⌊r/m′⌋ such cells and ignore extra revolutionaries. By Theorem 7.3,
the number of spies needed to keep the revolutionaries from winning is at least ⌊⌊r/m′⌋ /2⌋.
For even m, let m′ = m/2. The revolutionaries can group into ⌊r/m′⌋ cells of size m′
and play a game with meeting size 2. In the lower bound of Theorem 7.2, we replace r by
the number of cells in this imagined game, which is ⌊2r/m⌋. Dropping the outer ceiling
function, the resulting lower bound is 1
5
⌊
7
2
⌊
2r
m
⌋− 3⌋. We use ⌊2r
m
⌋
> 2r
m
− 1 to obtain the
slightly simpler expression claimed. It improves on the bound above whenm ∈ {4, 8, 10}.
Finally, we consider upper bounds for σ(G,m, r) when G is an r-large bipartite graph,
proved by giving strategies for the spies.
Definition 7.5. Henceforth, always G is an r-large bipartite graph with partite sets X1
and X2, and we consider the game RS(G,m, r, s). Any statement that includes index j is
considered for both j = 1 and j = 2. The numbers of revolutionaries and spies in part j at
the beginning of the current round are denoted by rj and sj, respectively, and the number
of revolutionaries in part j that are on vertices covered by spies is denoted by cj. The
corresponding counts at the end of the round are denoted by r′j , s
′
j and c
′
j.
A spy that moves to Xj during the round is new ; spies that remained in Xj and did not
move are old. A meeting formed at a vertex in Xj during the round is new if at the end
of the previous round there was no meeting there; a meeting is old if it is not new. The
revolutionaries swarm Xj in a round if at the end of the round all revolutionaries are in Xj .
Definition 7.6. A greedy migration strategy is a strategy for the spies having the following
properties. First, no vertex ever has more than one spy on it. Next, after the revolutionaries
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move during the current round and the spies compute the new desired distribution s′1, s
′
2 of
spies on X1 and X2, they move to reach that distribution as follows. Since s
′
1 + s
′
2 = s1+ s2,
by symmetry there is an index i ∈ {1, 2} such that s′i ≤ s3−i. The spies reach their locations
for the end of the round via the following steps.
(1) s′i spies move away from X3−i, iteratively leaving vertices that now have the fewest
revolutionaries among those in X3−i.
(2) All si spies previously on Xi leave Xi and move to uncovered vertices in X3−i, itera-
tively covering vertices having the most revolutionaries.
(3) The s′i spies that left X3−i now move to uncovered vertices in Xi, iteratively covering
vertices having the most revolutionaries.
Remark 7.7. At the end of round t under a greedy migration strategy, we designate each
meeting or spy as “old” or “new”. An old meeting is a meeting at a vertex where there was
also a meeting at the start of round t; all other meetings at the end of round t are new. An
old spy is a spy who did not move during round t; all spies who moved are new spies.
For j ∈ {1, 2} either all spies that end round t in Xj are new (started round t in X3−j),
or all spies that started round t in X3−j are new (end round t in Xj). In the specification of
the movements in Definition 7.6, the former occurs when j = i, and the latter occurs when
j = 3− i. In the first case, round t ends with s′j new spies in Xj ; in the second case, it ends
with s3−j new spies in Xj. In particular, at least min{s′j, s3−j} spies in Xj are new.
Lemma 7.8. A greedy migration strategy in RS(G,m, r, s) is a winning strategy for the spies
if it prevents the revolutionaries from winning by swarming a part.
Proof. As in Definition 7.5, Let rj, sj , r
′
j, s
′
j count the revolutionaries and spies at vertices of
Xj at the start and end of round t, respectively, and define old and new meetings and spies
as in Remark 7.7. We show that if a given greedy migration strategy for the spies keeps the
revolutionaries from winning by swarming on round t or round t + 1, then all meetings are
covered at the end of round t. Hence the revolutionaries never win.
By swarming to X3−j in round t, the revolutionaries can produce at least ⌊rj/m⌋ new
meetings there. Since these meetings can be covered only by spies in Xj at the start of
round t, and the strategy prevents the revolutionaries from winning by this swarm, we
obtain sj ≥ ⌊rj/m⌋ (and similarly s3−j ≥ ⌊r3−j/m⌋). Applying the same argument in round
t+ 1 yields s′j ≥
⌊
r′j/m
⌋
.
If all s′j spies in Xj at the end of round t are new, then they cover all the meetings in
Xj, since s
′
j ≥
⌊
r′j/m
⌋
and greedy migration maximizes the coverage. Hence we may assume
that some of these s′j spies are old. Now Remark 7.7 implies that all s3−j spies in X3−j at
the start of round t moved to Xj during round t. We consider two cases:
Case 1: In round t every old meeting in Xj is covered by some old spy. In this case
it remains to show that at the end of round t, the s3−j new spies in Xj cover all the new
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meetings there. We claim that otherwise the revolutionaries could have won in round t by
swarming to Xj. A revolutionary who stayed in Xj or moved from X3−j to Xj in the actual
round t also would do so in a swarm to Xj . A revolutionary who moved from Xj to X3−j
would instead remain in Xj in the swarm, and a revolutionary who stayed in X3−j in the
actual round would move to a Xj in in the swarm. Thus the swarm produces at least as
many new meetings, and the same number of old meetings, as the revolutionaries’ actual
moves in round t. The spies therefore cannot cover all of the new meetings formed by this
swarm if their greeting migration does not cover all of the new meetings actually formed in
Xj in round t.
Case 2: At the end of round t some old meeting in Xj is not covered by an old spy. Since
greedy migration picks departing spies to minimize the number of revolutionaries uncovered,
all old spies who remain in Xj are covering meetings. The new spies who move to Xj
maximize coverage, so if there is an uncovered meeting in Xj at the end of round t, then
every spy in Xj is covering a meeting. Since s
′
j ≥
⌊
r′j/m
⌋
, all the meetings are covered.
Theorem 7.9. If G is an r-large complete bipartite graph, then σ(G, 2, r) ≤ ⌈ ⌊7r/2⌋−3
5
⌉
.
Proof. Let s =
⌈ ⌊7r/2⌋−3
5
⌉
; we give a winning strategy for the spies in RS(G, 2, r, s). Let
α = s − ⌊r/2⌋ and β = ⌊(r − α)/2⌋. Later we will use the following inequalities: α ≤ β,
α + β ≤ s, and ⌊(r + β)/2⌋ ≤ s. These inequalities can be checked explicitly for each
congruence class modulo 10. The first two are loose, since α ≈ 2r/10, β ≈ 4r/10, and
s ≈ 7r/10, but the third is delicate, with equality holding except in two congruence classes
and the floor function needed for correctness in four congruence classes.
During the game, if the revolutionaries swarm X3−j in the current round, then they
generate at most min{rj,
⌊ r−c3−j
2
⌋} new meetings. The spy strategy will ensure
sj ≥ min
{
rj ,
⌊
r − c3−j
2
⌋}
for j ∈ {1, 2}, (A)
and hence it will keep the revolutionaries from winning by a swarm. The spies move by
greedy migration after computing the new values s′1 and s
′
2 in response to r
′
1 and r
′
2. By
Lemma 7.8, the spies win by a greedy migration strategy that keeps the revolutionaries from
winning by swarm.
The spies determine s′1 and s
′
2 via three cases, using the first that applies. Always
s′1 + s
′
2 = s.
Case 1: If r′i ≤ α for some i ∈ {1, 2}, then s′i = α.
Case 2: If si ≥ min{r′3−i, β} for some i ∈ {1, 2}, then s′3−i = min{r′3−i, β}.
Case 3: Otherwise, s′i = s3−i and s
′
3−i = si.
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It remains to prove (A). In order to do so, we first prove
sj ≥ α for j ∈ {1, 2}. (B).
Trivially the spies can satisfy both (A) and (B) in round 0. Assuming that these invariants
hold before the current round begins, we will show that they also hold when it ends.
Invariant (B) is preserved. In Case 1, s′i = α and s
′
3−i = ⌊r/2⌋ > α. In Case 3,
s′j = s3−j ≥ α. In Case 2, r′3−i > α, so s′3−i = min{r′3−i, β} ≥ α, and s′i = s − s′3−i =
s−min{r′3−i, β} ≥ s− β ≥ α.
Invariant (A) is preserved. In Case 1, s′i = α ≥ r′i ≥ min{r′i,
⌊
r−c′
3−i
2
⌋
} and s′3−i =
⌊r/2⌋ ≥
⌊
r−c′
3−i
2
⌋
≥ min{r′i,
⌊
r−c′
3−i
2
⌋
}.
In Case 2 with si ≥ min{r′3−i, β}, first consider j = 3 − i. We have s′3−i = min{r′3−i, β}.
If s′3−i = r
′
3−i, then s
′
3−i is already big enough, so suppose s
′
3−i = β. By Remark 7.7, at
least min{s′i, s3−i} spies in Xi are new. By (B), this quantity is at least α, and Case 2
requires r′i > α. Hence the new spies cover at least α revolutionaries, and c
′
i ≥ α yields
s′3−i = β =
⌊
r−α
2
⌋ ≥ min{r′3−i, ⌊r−c′i2 ⌋}.
Now consider j = i. By Remark 7.7, at least min{si, s′3−i} spies in Xi are new, and
in Case 2 each of si and s
′
3−i is at least min{r′3−i, β}. Since spies cover greedily, c′3−i ≥
min{r′3−i, β} = s′3−i. Also s′3−i ≤ β, so
s′i = s− s′3−i ≥
⌊
r + β
2
⌋
− s′3−i ≥
⌊
r − s′3−i
2
⌋
≥
⌊
r − c′3−i
2
⌋
≥ min
{
r′i,
⌊
r − c′3−i
2
⌋}
. (8)
Finally, s′j = s3−j < min{r′j, β} in Case 3, since Case 2 does not apply. Since all spies
move and s′j ≤ r′j, we have c′j ≥ s′j. Hence for each j the computation in (8) is valid.
The method for the upper bound when m = 3 is essentially the same.
Theorem 7.10. If G is an r-large complete bipartite graph, then σ(G, 3, r) ≤ ⌊r/2⌋.
Proof. We present a greedy migration strategy for ⌊r/2⌋ spies that keeps the revolutionaries
from winning by swarming; by Lemma 7.8 it is a winning strategy for the spies.
Define rj , sj, cj at the start of a round and r
′
j, s
′
j, c
′
j at the end of the round in the same
way as before. Also, we need to know the maximum number of revolutionaries together
on an uncovered vertex in Xj at the beginning and end of the round; let these values be
uj and u
′
j. If the revolutionaries have not already won, then uj, u
′
j ≤ 2. Let s = ⌊r/2⌋,
α = ⌊r/2⌋ − ⌊r/3⌋, and β = s− ⌊(r − α)/3⌋. We will want the inequalities β ≥ ⌊ r−2α
3
⌋
and
β ≤ ⌈ ⌊r/2⌋
2
⌉
. The latter is always satisfied (the left side is about 2r/9 and the right side is
about r/4), but both sides of the first inequality are about 2r/9. Checking each congruence
class modulo 18 shows that β ≥ ⌊ r−2α
3
⌋
except when r ≡ 3 mod 18.
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The values s′1 and s
′
2 that determine the movements of spies in this round under the
greedy migration strategy are computed as follows, with s′3−i = s − s′i always. Note that
since r′1 + r
′
2 = r, when one of the cases below holds, it holds for exactly one index i unless
r′1 = r
′
2 = r/2. In this case of equality, it does not matter which index we call i.
Case 1: If r′i ≤ α for some i ∈ {1, 2}, then s′i = α.
Case 2: If α < r′i ≤ β for some i ∈ {1, 2}, then s′i = r′i.
Case 3: If β < r′i ≤ 2β for some i ∈ {1, 2}, then s′i = β, except that s′i = β+1 when si = α
and r ≡ 3 mod 18.
Case 4: If 2β < r′i ≤ ⌊r/2⌋ for some i ∈ {1, 2}, then s′i = ⌊r′i/2⌋.
Let fj = min{
⌊ r−c3−j
3
⌋
,
⌊ rj
3−u3−j
⌋}. During the game, if the revolutionaries swarm X3−j
in the current round, then they generate at most fj new meetings. Hence it suffices to show
that the strategy specified above always ensures
sj ≥ fj for j ∈ {1, 2}. (A)
As in Theorem 7.9, in order to prove (A) we will also need
sj ≥ α for j ∈ {1, 2}. (B)
Place the spies to satisfy (A) and (B) in round 0. In each Case of play, α ≤ s′i ≤ ⌊r/4⌋ ≤ s−α,
so (B) is preserved. Now s1, s2, s
′
1, s
′
2 ≥ α, and we study (A).
With f ′j being the value of fj at the end of the round, we need s
′
j ≥ f ′j. By Remark 7.7,
each part receives at least α new spies in each round. In Cases 2, 3, and 4 each part contains
at least α revolutionaries, so c′j ≥ α in those cases. Also s′j ≥
⌊
r′j/3
⌋
in each Case. Since
s′j ≥
⌊
r′j/3
⌋
=
⌊
r′j/(3− u′3−j)
⌋
when u′3−j = 0, we may assume u
′
j ∈ {1, 2}.
In addition, since the greedy strategy places new spies in Xj to maximize coverage,
leaving an uncovered vertex with u′j revolutionaries implies that each of the (at least) α new
spies covers at least u′j revolutionaries at its vertex. Hence c
′
j ≥ u′jα.
Invariant (A) is preserved:
In Case 1, s′i = α ≥ r′i ≥ f ′i and s′3−i = s− α ≥ ⌊r/3⌋ ≥ f ′3−i.
In Case 2, s′i = r
′
i ≥ f ′i . Also, c′i ≥ α and s′3−i = s− r′i ≥ s− β =
⌊
r−α
3
⌋ ≥ ⌊ r−c′i
3
⌋ ≥ f ′3−i.
In Case 3, then c′i ≥ α. In the nonexceptional case, s′3−i = s−β =
⌊
r−α
3
⌋ ≥ ⌊ r−c′i
3
⌋ ≥ f ′3−i.
If si = α and r ≡ 3 mod 18, then s′3−i = s−β−1 and we must be a bit more careful. Since
all α spies that were in Xi move to X3−i, and r′i ≥ β + 1, we have c′i ≥ β + 1, and hence⌊
r−α
3
⌋− 1 ≥ ⌊ r−c′i
3
⌋
.
In Case 3 or Case 4, if u′3−i = 1, then s
′
i ≥ ⌊r′i/2⌋ =
⌊ r′i
3−u′
3−i
⌋ ≥ f ′i . If u′3−i = 2, then
c′3−i ≥ 2α. Hence s′i ≥ β ≥
⌊
r−2α
3
⌋ ≥ ⌊ r−c′3−i
3
⌋ ≥ f ′i , with the exception that β = ⌊ r−2α3 ⌋− 1
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when r ≡ 3 mod 18. In this case either s′i > β, which suffices, or si > α. If si > α, then
X3−j has more than α new spies, so c′3−i ≥ 2α+2, which fixes the problem for r ≡ 3 mod 18.
In Case 4, if u′i = 1, then s
′
3−i = s −
⌊ r′i
2
⌋ ≥ ⌊ r′3−i
2
⌋
=
⌊ r′
3−i
3−u′i
⌋ ≥ f ′3−i. If u′i = 2, then
c′i ≥ 2α. Now s′3−i = s−
⌊ r′i
2
⌋ ≥ ⌊ r
2
⌋− ⌊ ⌊r/2⌋
2
⌋
=
⌈ ⌊r/2⌋
2
⌉ ≥ ⌊ r−2α
3
⌋ ≥ ⌊ r−c′i
3
⌋ ≥ f ′3−i.
Theorem 7.11. If G is an r-large complete bipartite graph, then σ(G,m, r) ≤ (1+ 1√
3
) r
m
+1.
Proof. For s ≥ (1 + 1√
3
) r
m
+ 1, we present a greedy migration strategy for s spies that keeps
the revolutionaries from winning by swarming. Suppose first that r
m
< 1
1−1/√3 < 2.5. In this
case, the revolutionaries can never make more than two meetings. We want to show that at
most 4.75 spies suffice. In fact, four spies always suffice, because they can always arrange
to keep two spies on each side to handle up to two new meetings on the other side. The
greedy migration strategy that always sets s1 = s2 = 2 accomplishes this. Henceforth, we
may assume r
m
≥ 1
1−1/√3 .
As usual, rj and sj count the revolutionaries and spies in Xj to begin a round, r
′
j counts
the revolutionaries after they move, and s′j is the number of spies to be computed for Xj to
end the round. To determine s′1 and s
′
2, the spies compute x, α, u1, and u2 (not necessarily
integers) such that
x ≤ ⌊r/m⌋ , x+ r/m+ 1 ≤ s, and (9)
α = x+ r/m− r − u1x
m
= x+ r/m− r
′
2
m− u1 =
r′1
m− u2 =
r − u2x
m
. (10)
We will show that such numbers always exist. Now s′1 and s
′
2 are computed as follows:
Case 1: If α ≤ x, then s′1 = ⌈x⌉ and s′2 = s− s′1.
Case 2: If α > ⌊r/m⌋, then s′1 = ⌊r/m⌋ and s′2 = s− s′1.
Case 3: If x < α ≤ ⌊r/m⌋, then s′1 = ⌈α⌉ and s′2 = s− s′1.
Since always s′j ≥ x, greedy migration moves at least ⌈x⌉ new spies to each part in each
round, by Remark 7.7. Consider a swarm. If all uncovered vertices in Xj have at most uj
revolutionaries, then swarming Xj generates at most r
′
3−j/(m − uj) new meetings. If some
uncovered vertex in Xj has more than uj revolutionaries, then by greedy migration at least
x spies in Xj have covered more than uj revolutionaries each, and swarming Xj forms at
most (r − ujx)/m new meetings. Hence swarming Xj fails to win if
s′3−j ≥ max
{
r′3−j
m− uj ,
r − ujx
m
}
. (11)
For j = 2, both quantities on the right in (11) equal α, so the condition is equivalent to
s′1 ≥ α, which holds in Cases 1 and 3. In Case 2, s′1 = ⌊r/m⌋, which always protects against
swarming X2 since at most ⌊r/m⌋ meetings can be made.
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For j = 1, both quantities on the right in (11) equal x + r/m − α, so the condition is
equivalent to s′2 ≥ x+ r/m− α. Since s− 1 ≥ x+ r/m, proving s′2 ≥ s− 1− α shows that
swarming X1 is ineffective. In Case 1, s
′
2 > r/m, which suffices. In Case 2 or 3, s
′
1 ≤ ⌈α⌉, so
s′2 ≥ s− ⌈α⌉ > s− 1− α, as desired.
It remains to show that such numbers exist. Solving (10) yields
x =
√
9r2 + 12r′1r − 12r′12
6m
u1 =
r +mx−√r2 + 2rxm+ x2m2 − 4xr′1m
2x
and
u2 =
r +mx−√r2 − 2rxm+ x2m2 + 4xr′1m
2x
.
Since x ≤ r/(√3m), the inequalities in (9) hold when r
m
≥ 1
1−1/√3 .
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